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LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS; Senate Bill 97: Are Foreign Law Bans
Helpful or Harmful for Montana?
Hannah Wilson
I.

INTRODUCTION

Foreign law bans have grown increasingly prevalent in the United
States in recent years. Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee have all
successfully passed anti-foreign law bills.1 Dozens of other states have
proposed similar legislation.2 The Montana House and Senate
passed Senate Bill 97 before Governor Steve Bullock vetoed it on April 6,
2017.3 Bills like Senate Bill 97 have undergone fine-tuning to avoid
constitutional violations of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.4 These bills incite heated, emotional
testimony from local constituents, including those at Montana’s 2017 65th
Legislative Session , and garner national attention. The “foreign
law” mentioned in these bills should not be confused with “international
law.” Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, international
law accepted by the U.S. (through Senate and Presidential approval)
becomes part of American law.5 Foreign law, in contrast, should never be
considered part of U.S. law and may only be used if it does not violate
public policy.6
II.

MONTANA’S ATTEMPT TO BAN FOREIGN LAW IN STATE
COURTS

Montana attempted to prohibit the application of foreign laws in
state courts with Senate Bill 97. Senator Keith Regier of
Kalispell sponsored the bill, which aimed to prohibit foreign law from
being used where it would violate the state and federal constitutional rights
of citizens.7 It does not prohibit foreign law in all circumstances. Instead,
it would have allowed the practice of Sharia and other foreign law in
situations where constitutional rights will not be infringed, recognizing
1

Idaho GOP Pushes Bill Banning Islamic Law in State Courts. Fox News U.S. (February 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/L7DL-5UY (last visited May 10, 2017) [hereinafter “Idaho GOP”].
2
Id.
3
Detailed Bill Information, 65th Leg. Sess., (Mont. 2017), https://perma.cc/JC48-FR43, (last visited
May 7, 2017) [hereinafter “Detailed Bill Information”].
4
U.S. Const. amend. I.
5
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Faiza Patel, et al., Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical
Problems, Center for American Progress & the Brennan Center for Justice, 9 (May 2013),
https://perma.cc/FGA8-QLMQ (last visited May 7, 2017). [hereinafter “Foreign Law Bans”].
6
Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5.
7
Prohibit the Application of Foreign Law in State Courts, S. 97, 65th Leg. (Mont. 2017) [hereinafter
“S. 97”].
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the “right to contract freely under the laws of this state.”8 If it had
passed, Senate Bill 97 would have effectively voided contractual
agreements that use foreign law in conflict with Montana or U.S. federal
laws and Constitutions.9 The bill survived third readings in the Montana
House and Senate before Governor Steve Bullock vetoed it on April 6,
2017.10
Much of the discussion about the bill revolved around the realities
of its implementation.11 Generally, opponents to the bill claimed it is
“unnecessary,” and recognized the protection of our rights under the
“robust” Montana and U.S. Constitutions.12 Eamon Ormseth, a Missoula
resident, cited Article 6, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution during his
testimony:13
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State
to the contrary notwithstanding.14
Under this provision, the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, and the additional protections of rights that Senate Bill 97 might
provide
are
unnecessary
because
foreign
laws do
not
threaten constitutional rights. U.S. courts have always required that
reliance on foreign law not violate public policy,15 and this is reiterated in
the bill’s text.16 Others credit the present lack of application of foreign law
to the judiciary already “applying the right laws in each situation,”17
rendering Senate Bill 97 even more unnecessary.
Senator Regier described the bill as a clarifying instrument for the
court system to rely on when a case could implicate some foreign law.18
Rather than deferring to the judicial branch to prohibit the application of
foreign law in Montana state courts, this bill preempts any choice of
foreign law before the issue makes it to court. Regier assured the Judiciary
Committee that “guaranteeing the freedoms that we have under the
Montana Constitution and the U.S. Constitution [is the intent of the
8

Id.
Id.
10
Detailed Bill Information, supra note 3.
11
Prohibit the Application of Foreign Law in State Courts : Hearing on S. 97 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 65th Mont. Leg. (Jan. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “S. 97 Hearing”].
12
Id.
13
Id. (testimony of Eamon Ormseth, Missoula resident).
14
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. II.
15
See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918) (establishing that
enforcement of a law is not required when it “would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal”).
16
S. 97, supra note 7.
17
S. 97 Hearing, supra note 11 (Paraphrased testimony of S.K. Rossi, Advocacy and Policy
Director, ACLU of Montana).
18
S. 97 Hearing, supra note 11.
9
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bill].”19 From this perspective, the proposed law was characterized as a
harmless clarifying instrument that would put Montana citizens at ease
about the type of law being practiced in their state courts and reinforce the
supremacy of Montana’s state law. This is typical of foreign law bans, as
most are “crafted so that they seem to track the rules normally followed
by courts when considering whether to apply foreign law.”20 They are
“duplicative of safeguards that are already enshrined in federal and state
law.”21 Furthermore, many foreign law bans in the U.S. are proposed in
states that cannot even cite a single instance of foreign law being applied
in their home courts.22 Based on these facts and characterizations, foreign
law bans in general seem unnecessary because judges already have
sufficient tools to guard against unconstitutional abuses of foreign law in
state courts.23
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF FOREIGN LAW BANS

The American Bar Association (“ABA”) opposes “federal or state
laws that impose blanket prohibitions on consideration or use by courts or
arbitral tribunals of foreign or international law”24 because they infringe
on constitutional rights.25 Anti-foreign law legislation typically takes one
of two formats: Sharia-specific and facially-neutral bills. These bills
should always be constitutionally suspect because their breadth of scope
varies.26 This section will discuss Oklahoma’s navigation of these issues
in Awad v. Ziriax27 and the precedent it sets for other state foreign law
bans, including Montana’s.
The Establishment Clause prohibits the U.S. government from
favoring a particular religion.28 If a state bans a set of laws that have
religious ties, such as Sharia, it risks violating the Establishment Clause,
as Oklahoma was found to have done in 2013.29 In 2010, the Oklahoma
House of Representatives introduced Joint Resolution 1056.30 It included
the following language: “Specifically, the courts shall not consider Sharia
Law, international law, the constitutions, laws, rules, regulations, and
19

Id.
Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 3.
Salli A. Swartz, 113A: Report 3, Washington: American Bar Association, 4 (2011),
https://perma.cc/XN7C-5VN3 (last visited May 7, 2017) [hereinafter “ABA Resolution”].
22
Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 5.
23
David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law Obstruct the
Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1647 (2012).
24
ABA Resolution, supra note 21.
25
Id. at 2.
26
Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 15.
27
670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012).
28
U.S. Const. amend. I; See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971).
29
Ryan J. Reilly, Oklahoma Anti-Sharia Constitutional Amendment Struck Downby Federal Judge ,
Huffington Post (August 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/T2ZL-CXJH (last visited May 7, 2017); H.J.R.
1056, 52nd Leg., 2nd Sess. (Okla. 2013) [hereinafter “OK Amendment”].
30
Awad, 670 F.3d at 1117.
20
21

2017

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: SENATE BILL 97

69

decisions of courts or tribunals of other nations, or conventions or treaties,
whether or not the United States is a party.”31 In response to the proposed
amendment, Muneer Awad, a Muslim-American, claimed that because the
amendment singled out Sharia law as a prohibited legal instrument in
Oklahoma his rights were violated under both the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause.32
Generally, the test for determining whether a generally applicable
foreign law ban violates the Establishment Clause is the Lemon test.33 In
order to withstand challenges to the Establishment Clause, a foreign law
ban must satisfy the elements of the Lemon test, because foreign law
bans typically implicitly include the ban of religious legal systems.34 The
three prongs of the Lemon test require that: (1) the law must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.35 Lemon applies to “ laws affording uniform
benefit to all religions, and not to provisions . . . that
discriminate among religions.”36 Montana’s Senate Bill 97 was a
generally applicable foreign law ban, because it did not specifically
prohibit Sharia law.37
However, instead
of applying the Lemon test, the
Court in Awad relied on the test from Larson v. Valente.38 The Larson test
requires strict scrutiny for laws that discriminate among religions.39
Under Larson, if a law discriminates among religions, it can survive only
if it is “closely fitted to the furtherance of any compelling interest
asserted.”40 The Larson test applies to foreign law bans like Oklahoma’s
proposed amendment because the proposed amendment specifically
singles out Sharia law as being prohibited, which presents even
stronger “explicit and deliberate distinctions ” among religions than the
provision that warranted strict scrutiny in Larson.”41 Because the
amendment discriminates among religions, it is “ suspect, ” and it failed
the Court’s application of strict scrutiny.42
The Free Exercise Clause may also be implicated by foreign law
bans, though it was not applied in Awad.43 To overcome a challenge based
on the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice must
31

OK Amendment, supra note 29.
Awad , 670 F.3d at 1119.
33
See 403 U.S. 602 at 612-13.
34
What is Sharia Law and How Does it Apply in America?, HG.ORG, https://perma.cc/K4WYYDVDC (last visited May 16, 2017).
35
403 U.S. 602 at 612-13.
36
Id. at 606.
37
S. 97, supra note 7.
38
456 U.S. 228 at 246 (1982).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
U.S. Const. amend. I.
32
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be neutral and generally applicable.44 If the law is both neutral and
generally applicable, it does not require a compelling state interest.
However, if the law is discriminatory, the state must have a compelling
interest for the law and it must be narrowly tailored to that interest.45 If a
state seeks to prohibit a religious legal system, it must show a compelling
interest in doing so because it effectively discriminates against a religious
group without justification.46 Oklahoma was unable to produce a
compelling state interest for singling out and prohibiting Sharia law and
the Tenth Circuit struck down the amendment in 2012.47 Because the
Oklahoma law was found to be in violation of the Establishment Clause,
the Court provided no discussion about its relationship with the Free
Exercise Clause.48
Before
the
Tenth
Circuit
handed
down
the Awad decision, Alabama Republican Senator Gerald Allen sponsored
the “Sharia Law Amendment” in his state in 2011.49 The proposed
amendment singled out Sharia law.50 The amendment never reached the
ballot due to constitutional issues similar to those in Oklahoma; it was
struck down by the Alabama Supreme Court in 2011.51 However, three
years later, its facially-neutral cousin, “Amendment One,” passed the
Alabama legislature in 2014.52 Amendment One ’s creators marketed it as
“guidance to judges,” rather than an attack on Islamic law.53 Because the
amendment did not discriminate among religions, it only needed to
overcome the Lemon test, not the strict scrutiny Larson test. Thus, it
passed constitutional muster.
In response to the Tenth Circuit holding in Awad and the passage
of Amendment One in Alabama, the American Public Policy Alliance
created the “American Laws for American Courts” (“ALAC”), which
provides model provisions for anti-foreign law bills.54 The ALAC was
“crafted to protect American citizens’ constitutional rights against the
infiltration and incursion of foreign laws and foreign legal doctrines,
especially Islamic Shariah Law.”55 Its provisions carefully outline faciallyneutral rules that can be modified and used by individual states. Facially44

Awad , 670 F.3d at 1119.
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
Awad , 670 F.3d at 1129–30.
47
Id.; see also Kimberly Karseboom, Sharia Law and America: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting
the Consideration of Sharia Law in American Courts, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 680 (2012).
48
Awad , 670 F.3d at 1119.
49
Sharia Law Amendment, S.R. 62 (Ala. 2012).
50
Id.; see also Kay Campbell, Amendment One to Outlaw ‘Foreign Law’ in Alabama? Not Such a
Good Idea, Some Christians Say, Alabama Media Group (October 30, 2014),
https://perma.cc/NDS8-P6CW (last visited May 7, 2017) [hereinafter “Outlaw”].
51
Outlaw, supra note 50.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
American Laws for American Courts, American Public Policy Alliance, https://perma.cc/98DZX65T (last visited May 7, 2017).
55
Id.
45
46
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neutral foreign law bans are designed to prevent judicial enforcement and
application of foreign law only when the enforcement would violate public
policy or constitutional protections.56 They survive challenges to the Free
Exercise Clause because they are facially-neutral, generally applicable,
and do not target or discriminate against particular religious practices.57
This type of strategic generalization and neutralization has
permitted Alabama, Arizona, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee to pass anti-foreign
law bills that prevent the use of Sharia law in their state courts by not
specifically prohibiting it in the bill text, thus skirting violations of the
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause.58 Montana ’s
unsuccessful bid to join these states59 was indicative of a greater trend in
the U.S. in 2017. Nine other states also attempted to pass anti-foreign law
bills in 2017.60
Ultimately, facially-neutral bills are more constitutionally sound
than specific Sharia law bans because they do not explicitly discriminate
against a particular religion. This means that in order for the bills to be
successful, the legislative intent (to ban Sharia law in state courts)61 must
diverge from the textual message of the bill (that all foreign law should be
banned in state courts). This complicates the application of the laws in
court because legislative intent may be considered when applying a
particular law.62 The meaning of “foreign law ban” will be ascertained by
reviewing legislative debates and commission reports.63
IV.

A MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION ON FOREIGN LAW BANS:
THE EFFECT ON GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Regardless of whether state foreign law bans are found to
be constitutional, this type of legislation has profound impacts on
diplomacy, foreign law practice, and globalization. If states like Montana
enact foreign law bans, they essentially require U.S. lawyers, judges, and
constituents to “pretend that foreign and international laws do not exist”64
in the context of the state’s legal framework.
Respecting foreign law is important for international
relations. In the absence of foreign law ban legislation, “foreign law is
56

Bradford J. Kelley, Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA. L. REV. 601, 625, n.103
(2013).
57
Id. at 627.
58
Idaho GOP, supra note 1.
59
S. 97, supra note 7.
60
Idaho GOP, supra note 1.
61
Matt Volz, Montana Legislature Set to Pass Anti-Sharia Law Bill, U.S. News(March 20, 2017),
https://perma.cc/E7WR-ERVU (last visited May 7, 2017).
62
Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 864 (1930).
63
Id.
64
Nersessian, supra note 23, at 1648.
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honored in both federal and state courts as long as it does not conflict with
public policy.”65 States might consider implementing foreign law in a
variety of situations, including contract disputes where parties have agreed
to use the law of another nation as controlling in their case, or where a
family law arrangement determined by another country is questioned.66
This respect of foreign law fosters diplomatic international relations and
peace by promoting international comity.67 International comity is the
“harmony arising out of respect demonstrated by judicial officers in one
jurisdiction for legal determinations in another, particularly on matters
involving the foreign state’s own laws.”68 If U.S. states disregard comity
and respect of foreign law, they could impact the federal interest of
preserving good relations with foreign nations.69 With comity also
comes reciprocity, an essential element in determining sovereignty and
independence among nation states.70 This reciprocity serves a practical
purpose: if the U .S. seeks to have U.S. law recognized in foreign
countries, it should respect foreign law more in its state courts, even if in
practice it is rarely or never used. As Chief Justice Fuller articulated in
Underhill v. Hernandez, “our courts do not sit in judgment of the laws and
values of other countries because we do not want foreign nations to pass
judgment on our own.”71
Comparative law serves a valuable purpose in progressing and
evolving the law. In 2002, Aharon Barak, then the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Israel, wrote that when U.S. judges turn a blind eye to
comparative law, “[t]hey fail to make use of an important source of
inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and
strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different legal
systems.” As a result, he argued that the U.S. Supreme Court “is losing the
central role it once had among courts in modern democracies.”72 U.S. law
and the U.S. Constitution are being used less frequently as models for
other countries’ constitutions and legal documents.73
Foreign law bans could inhibit international law from working
effectively. International law has been perceived as weak, unenforceable,
and too idealistic for practical use, especially in a domestic law

65

Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 10.
Id. at 3.
67
Id. at 10.
68
Nersessian, supra note 23, at 1658.
69
Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 10 .
70
See Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964).
71
168 U.S. 250 at 252 (1897).
72
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 114 (2002); see also Jenny S. Martinez, Who’s Afraid of International and
Foreign Law, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1588 (2016).
73
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012) (discussing how other countries more frequently model their
constitutions and legal documents after Canada ’s than the United States).
66
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framework.74 Conceivably, a foreign law ban could prevent international
law from being executed effectively and consistently among jurisdictions,
depending on how “foreign” is defined and interpreted by a state. A
state ’s definition of “foreign” could be so broad as to include aspects of
international law.75 This is another issue with the vagueness of many of
the facially-neutral proposed and implemented foreign law bans. The ABA
has discussed this problem, predicting that “uncertainty created by the
relationship of foreign law bans to the application of international law in
state courts ‘is likely to have an unanticipated and widespread negative
impact on business.’”76
There is a perception that states with foreign law bans “are hostile
to the application of foreign law, even if freely negotiated by the parties,
which makes it more difficult to negotiate for a domestic forum.”77 This
may cause a foreign company to insist on a foreign forum for legal
disputes instead of a U.S. legal forum which can apply the law of the
company’s own jurisdiction. Foreign parties may be encouraged to
“impose a high price in connection with some other term of the business
deal in exchange for agreeing to resolve future disputes in the U.S.”78
Foreign companies’ reluctance to subject themselves to a jurisdiction
which refuses to acknowledge foreign law could have an impact on
commerce
and
negatively
impact the
ability of
domestic
companies to do business transnationally. Even if the law does not
prohibit contractually-consented use of foreign law which does not violate
public policy, the underlying directive against foreign actors is
powerful because it sends a message that foreign laws will be
viewed unfavorably in state courts.79 This is a critically important
consideration in today’s global economy. As stated by the Court in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co.: “[w]e cannot have trade and commerce
in world markets . . . exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws.”80
Furthermore, the implementation of these bills could signal a shift
towards stricter anti-foreign law bills in the future. Foreign law bans are
relatively new, having only been systematically introduced since 2010.81
Foreign companies may not want to take the risk of doing business in
states where foreign law bans are indicative of a greater discriminatory
trend against foreign countries themselves. These projections along with

74

Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1113, 1178 (1999) (discussing how much of international law lacks centralized management
and rulemaking, international law content tracks interests of powerful nations, and nobody really
knows why nations comply with much of customary international law).
75
ABA Resolution, supra note 21, at 4.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 5.
78
Id. at 7.
79
Id. at 5–7.
80
407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
81
What is Sharia Law and How Does it Apply in America?, supra note 34.
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the effect of foreign law bans on international law and comity discourage
transnational economic development in a rapidly-globalizing world.
V.

CONCLUSION

The public hearings for Montana’s Senate Bill 97 were
emotionally-charged conversations with testimony from constituents from
all over Montana. It is important to consider constituents’ and
legislators’ genuine fear about an unknown body of law being used at the
county courthouse. A foreign law ban may not be unconstitutional on its
face, nor directly violate international law or consented-to agreements to
use foreign law in a contract or dispute, but it has numerous residual
impacts on society. It acts as a disincentive for foreign citizens or
corporations to conduct business in the state where a ban exists. In
addition, foreign law bans rob states of the benefits of using comparative
law to progress and evolve their legal systems.
International trade is an important part of the U.S. economy, and
as such international and foreign law is becoming more involved and
entangled with U.S. domestic law. However, globalization and effective
international cooperation may not fully develop while states enact such
legislation as Senate Bill 97. States that have enacted foreign law
ban s should repeal them, and states considering legislative foreign law
bans should reject them, as Montana did this year.82 It is possible to respect
foreign law while simultaneously protecting the public policy of the U.S.,
simply by deferring to the judicial branch to determine when it is
appropriate to use foreign law. Foreign law bans are unnecessary and have
more unfavorable impacts than benefits to American society and
commerce.

82

Foreign Law Bans, supra note 5, at 3.

